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Abstract: 
This article adapts and develops the idea of a “stealth” understanding of 
politics to explore how citizen’s estrangement from formal politics is 
processed cognitively through a populist lens. Earlier work has shown the 
widespread presence of stealth attitudes in the USA and Finland. We show 
that stealth attitudes are well established in Britain, demonstrate their 
populist character and reveal that age, newspaper readership and concerns 
about governing practices help predict their adoption by individuals. Yet 
our survey findings also reveal a larger body of positive attitudes towards 
the practice of democracy suggesting that there is scope for challenging 
populist angst.  We explore these so-called “sunshine” attitudes and 
connect them to the reform options favoured by citizens; concluding that 
improving the operation of representative politics is a factor key to 
challenging populist negativity 
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Introduction 
Evidence of mounting negativity towards politics in established democracies predates the 
economic downturn prompted by the global financial crisis – and it is likely to prove more 
enduring (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Torcal and Montero, 2006; 
Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011). To contribute meaningfully to the debate about disenchantment 
with the practice of politics and what might be done to alleviate it; political scientists need 
to provide answers to three questions. What is the form and structure of popular 
disenchantment? What is the extent of the stranglehold that it now exerts on the body 
politic? And what reform mechanisms might help to promote a more positive engagement 
with politics by citizens?  
Drawing on evidence from Britain  set in a broader comparative context this article tries to 
answer all three questions. We use established yet innovative survey measures tested in 
several countries to explore what British citizens think about politics and how it should 
work. We add additional evidence from focus groups in which citizens were given the 
opportunity to explore and propose reform measures that might improve politics and we 
test those ideas in the context of a wider and more representative sample of British citizens. 
In answer to the first question we argue that the expression of what irks many citizens 
about politics takes a modern populist form that we label ‘stealth populism’. We draw on 
the idea of stealth democracy originally proposed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) but 
reframe the understanding of stealth attitudes. This mind-set we see less as the expression 
of a commitment to a particular and preferred vision of democracy and more as an 
expression of populist angst about the current practice of politics. Stealth populists think 
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that in a democracy the political system should deliver what the people want without them 
having to pay continual attention to it. From such a perspective, the perceived failings of 
the current political system are a product of too much politicking. Politicians talk rather 
than act, make too many compromises to special interests and do not take sufficient 
cognizance of expertise to come to sensible decisions. Both the construction of expressed 
negativity towards politics and its drivers support our argument that stealth populism is a 
perspective with a populist character and origins.  
Our response to the second question about the depth of stealth populism is to argue that its 
grip is strong, but far from unbreakable. Public attitudes towards institutions such as the 
political system, which are rarely at the forefront of their attention, are always layered, 
regularly ambivalent and sometimes loosely formed. In particular, though citizens may well 
hold stealth values they typically do so alongside other more positive views about the 
operation of democratic politics and the potential role they might have in it (Neblo et al, 
2010a). Our empirical evidence confirms the presence of these more positive 
understandings. We label them, following the work of Neblo et al (2010a), ‘sunshine’ views 
of democratic politics. Their presence indicates an enduring capacity of citizens to see 
politics as operating in a manner close to long-established and familiar principles of liberal 
representative democracy. But, in contrast to Neblo et al and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, we 
do not see ‘stealth’ and ‘sunshine’ views as mutually exclusive, such that evidence of one 
might disconfirm the presence of the other. Rather, we see them as alternative 
understandings (pre-formed vernaculars, in effect) in and through which citizens make 
sense of different (and/or ambivalent) political cues (and which are typically triggered by 
those cues). Citizens, we suggest, have the capacity to view the politics they witness in 
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more optimistic or more pessimistic terms. The key question is how our politics might be 
reformed so as more consistently to trigger or cue their more positive disposition (or, 
indeed, to lead them to resolve the ambiguity or ambivalence inherent in many political 
cues in a more forgiving way).  
The final contribution of the article tackles this directly, by considering what might be done 
to reform  politics. What kind of political reforms would incline citizens more to express a 
‘sunshine’ disposition as opposed to passing an increasingly stealthy populist and cynical 
judgment of contemporary democratic practice? Our approach is to ask citizens themselves 
about their reform preferences by giving them the opportunity to reflect and deliberate 
collectively on the question. Using focus groups alongside new survey evidence we show 
that the reforms most favoured by British citizens are about restoring representative 
politics rather than necessarily grabbing new opportunities for participation. Populist 
negativity towards politics might be challenged so that stealth populism could be trumped 
by popular endorsement of the nuanced practice of liberal representative democracy 
providing that the behaviour of politicians changed and the context of the exchange 
between representatives and citizens was less dominated by spin and playing to the media 
gallery.  
The paper begins with a review of the scope and limitations of our various data sources. 
Thereafter we connect stealth attitudes to our understanding of populist negativity. We 
then test empirically that connection using original survey data from 2011/12 before 
exploring the presence of more positive sunshine attitudes using the same data set. Finally 
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we report on citizens’ reform preferences using material from focus groups conducted in 
2011/12 and additional survey work conducted late in 2012.   
Populist Angst in Contemporary Democracy:  Beyond Stealth versus Sunshine views  
Most contemporary commentators agree that, at its core, populism is an anti-phenomenon 
(Mudde, 2004; Mény and Surel, 2002). It relies on the distinction between a pure and 
sovereign people, on the one hand, and corrupt political elite on the other – and, of course, 
the (moral) supremacy of the former over the latter (Deiwiks, 2009 and Akkerman, 2003). 
A further distinction can be drawn between populism as a zeitgeist, a way of thinking about 
contemporary politics (Mudde, 2004; Mair, 2005), and populism as a political movement or 
form of political mobilization (whether of right or left) (Taggart, 2002; Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2008; Deiwiks, 2009).  In what follows we focus on populism as set of ideas that 
is prevalent in the judgement of contemporary democracies by citizens. The challenge is to 
find a way of encapsulating and measuring this populist zeitgeist.  
The literature on populism helps us towards a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.  
The rise of populism as a prevalent framing for contemporary politics rests on an 
ambiguity at the heart of democracy, as Margaret Canovan (1999) explains. Populism is a 
bi-product of the interplay between the ‘two faces of democracy’, one ‘redemptive’, the 
other ‘pragmatic’. The former views democracy ‘as rule by the people’. Accordingly, it 
regards politics as legitimate when it delivers unambiguously ‘what the people want’. By 
contrast, the latter more pragmatic view is more focused on the compromises, deals and 
institutional devices that enable different interests to be reconciled without resort to 
violence. Regular failures to deliver on the redemptive vision and the murky realties of 
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pragmatic democratic politics provide the breeding ground for populist attitudes. The 
palpable tension between these two understandings provides the space in which populism 
flourishes. Populism picks at the gap between a democracy seen through the narrow lens of 
rule by the people and that seen through the image of the complexities of liberal 
democratic governance.  
Trends in the long-term conduct of politics in contemporary democracies (including 
ostensibly benign processes such as the rise of multiculturalism) have arguably made the 
gap between rule by the people and liberal representative politics loom larger. The 
increased professionalization of politics has created a fertile breeding-ground for ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ populist stealth angst. As Mair (2005 p. 20) puts it, ‘traditional politics is seen 
less and less as something that belongs to the citizens or to the society, and is instead seen 
as something that is done by politicians’. Parties, lobbyists, think tankers and political 
advisors are professionals and operate increasingly within their own world of rules and 
norms divorced from standards of pecuniary and discursive honesty favoured by citizens in 
general (Allen and Birch, 2014).  
Moreover, the breakdown of traditional political platforms has encouraged political elites 
to adopt populist rhetoric to counter these trends and to take up, at times, anti-political 
stances themselves. It is elites rather than citizens that have led debates about the 
‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union and politicians have not been slow to run 
negative campaigns and accuse their opponents of incompetence, dishonesty, sleaze or 
corruption; moreover, it is again political elites who have led the move to the sub-
contracting of their decision-making powers to unelected experts, such as independent 
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central banks (Hay, 2007). These practices have effects. As Mudde (2004, p. 562) comments, 
‘after years of reading and hearing about dysfunctional national and supranational 
democracies, more and more people have become both sensitised to the problem, and 
convinced that things can and should be better’.  
Another trend credibly reinforcing the proliferation of populist attitudes is the 
‘mediatisation’ of politics and the role of tabloid coverage in promoting a populist 
negativity towards politics – in effect, a populist anti-politics which pits the people (and 
‘the will of the people’) against those who claim to represent them. The core role of the 
media in presenting contemporary politics is widely acknowledged (Mair, 2005; Street, 
2011). Moreover, our own work shows it to be widely understood by citizens themselves 
(Authors, 2015). As Mazzoleni (2008, p. 50) notes, ‘if we examine the processes of media-
driven representation and the symbolic construction of favourable opinion climates ... we 
find a significant degree of support for the rise of populist phenomena’. The impact of the 
media is complex in that mainstream media can play a crucial role in challenging populism 
and certainly in scrutinising populist political movements. The breeding ground for 
populist sentiment is, then, more likely to come from the tabloid or popular news media – 
and they have often been keen to present themselves in precisely such terms. Under 
commercial (or, indeed, proprietorial) pressure to maximise audience figures, such media 
sources typically present what is regarded as a simplified (more pejoratively, ‘dumbed 
down’) version of the news and perhaps also a more sensational and sensationalised view 
of what the ‘news’ is (Crick, 2005). The result is a characteristic tendency towards 
sensationalist accounts focused on scandals and personalities, presenting complex 
problems in terms of stark choices (Mazzoleni, 2008). Such news media typically present 
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themselves as guardians and guarantors of the people’s interest in a context in which such 
interests are in danger of being thwarted by political elites and the machinations of 
political power. 
The economic downturn experienced by many contemporary democracies and scandals 
over politicians expenses or allegations of corruption have added to the negative mood 
music surrounding politics. But it is the longer term factors identified above in the 
construction and reportage of politics that provide the bedrock to populist angst about 
democratic practice. The evidence relating to political disenchantment points to its 
considerable and sustained presence prior to the crisis, both in the UK (Stoker, 2006; Hay 
2007) and beyond (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004).  
Our argument is that a populist vernacular about politics has been consolidated over recent 
years, sourcing the negative commentary on its practices with a repertoire of discursive 
resources and an array of florid images and allusions. This picks at the gap between the 
ideal of ‘rule by the people’ and the complexities of modern representative politics. But 
how can that gap in public attitudes be operationlised and measured? Our solution is to 
turn to the debate about two putative and contrasting visions of democracy, labelled 
‘stealth’ and ‘sunshine’ perspectives by their advocates. The stealth view captures (as it 
characterises) the populist angst at the failure to deliver rule by the people and the 
sunshine view similarly seeks to capture (and characterise) citizens’ comprehension of the 
nuanced practices of liberal democracy. In what follows, we develop concepts originally 
developed for other purposes into frameworks for demonstrating the extent of populist 
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angst in contemporary democracies and the reserve pool of public understanding of the 
intricacies of democracy. 
The stealth framing was originally devised by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) as an 
attempt empirically to refute the expectations of some normative democratic theorists who 
emphasized the important of citizen participation to effective democracy. As such, their 
work makes them the present day inheritors of the perspective on democracy so 
powerfully articulated, in its modern form, by Schumpeter (1942). This perspective argues 
the most citizens want to ensure the protection of their interests and rights yet wish also to 
be disengaged from daily politics, as voting gives them the crucial power to select their 
leaders. The critics of the stealth model, most prominently Neblo et al (2010), use their 
own empirical work to rework the case for seeing unconditional participation as central to 
democracy. They seek to show that citizens exhibit a more positive orientation to the 
political engagement available to them. This they summarize as a ‘sunshine’ attitude to 
democratic practice, an understanding that recognizes both the opportunities afforded by 
contemporary democracy and its complexities.  
As the above discussion suggests, the debate between proponents of the stealth and 
sunshine theses replays, in a more contemporary context, a long-established debate, both 
empirical and normative, between elite and participative understandings of democracy 
(Held, 2006). Our aim is to move the debate on, by seeing stealth and sunshine perspective 
not as mutually exclusive but as contending vernaculars in and through which citizens 
might and do make sense of different political experiences. The stealth perspective, we 
contend, represents less a theory of elite democracy and more a populist expression of 
Page 8 of 38
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angst, a framework in and through which to rail against the perceived failing of democratic 
politics. The sunshine perspective represents the other side of the democratic gap picked at 
by populism, a more nuanced understanding of the nature and limits of liberal 
representative democracy. Most citizens, we suggest, retain the capacity to understand and 
make sense of the politics they experience in and through either system of thinking. As 
such, the presence of one cannot be taken as evidence of the absence of the other. Similarly, 
evidence of the presence of both cannot be taken as indicative of irrationality in citizens’ 
understandings of politics. 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) frame their discussion within the context of a strong 
awareness of popular understandings of the ills of contemporary democracy.  Yet they use 
the term populism, as they put it, ‘loosely, to refer to those who want to give the people 
more power’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002:52). This rather perverse definition of 
populism (in contrast to the theoretical landscape laid out above) blinds them to the rather 
obvious populist features of the stealth democracy that they argue most (US) citizens want. 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s starting point is that most citizens do not want to engage in the 
detail of politics in part because they assume that most people agree with them and in part 
because they dislike debate and messy compromise. Politics, for them, should be about 
getting on with delivering what the people want. Politicians should do what they say and 
get on with the task of governing – quietly, effectively and efficiently. Yet politics too often 
appears to be failing, dominated as it is by self-serving politicians, lobbyists and the dark 
arts of politicking and spin. Frustration with the political elite is such that experts or 
business leaders might be seen to be more likely to do better in delivering good 
government.  
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Our argument is that stealth attitudes among citizens need to be seen as an expression of a 
widespread and embedded populist understanding of politics in mature democracies. The 
stealth perspective gets its leverage from a populist understanding of the gap between how 
politics should be and how it is perceived to be. The drivers of stealth attitudes populism we 
would also expect to reflect its populist character. As such, stealth attitudes might have a 
broader but nonetheless shared constituency with the most strongly mobilised form of 
populism in contemporary UK politics – that expressed by UKIP (Ford and Goodwin, 2013). 
This has consistently been shown to be disproportionately male, of lower social status and 
from older age groups. We suspect that the stealth perspective is, in comparison with UKIP 
support, likely to attract support from individuals from across a broader social spectrum. 
But we suspect also that some of the demographic factors noted above may be in play, a 
proposition we test directly in what follows. Supporters of stealth populism are more likely 
to be users of populist media coverage of politics than those who follow politics through 
the more nuanced coverage from more detailed broadsheet media. In terms of their 
orientation towards politics we would envisage that its supporters would declare 
themselves less interested in politics, resistant to greater involvement in politics but 
confident enough in their own capacities to support a greater direct say for themselves 
over key issues. Those disproportionately inclined to express a stealth disposition do not 
see themselves as incapable citizens but as citizens frustrated by the failure of the political 
system to deliver. These citizens may not be deeply interested in politics but they do fear 
that the governing system is failing and they are likely to stand out in expressing that 
concern.  
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The sunshine perspective, in contrast, embraces much more closely a textbook version of 
liberal representative politics and its (legitimate) limits (Neblo et al. 2010a: 572, fn 18). It 
sees value in debate and deliberation and recognises the need to look for compromise. 
Accountable elected politicians need to be at the heart of decision-making in order for 
government to be legitimate. Whereas the stealth-oriented citizen will engage with politics 
only under sufferance (and in order to hold those in office in check), the sunshine-oriented 
citizen is a more willing participant as long as the political world corresponds sufficiently 
to the ideal of a level playing field (see also Authors 2015). From the stealth perspective, 
politics is about achieving efficiency in collective action; from the sunshine perspective it is 
about reconciling competing values. Advice from business and other experts in making 
public decisions has its place in this latter world, but the key role remains with elected 
politicians who need to have the final say (and bear the ultimate responsibility). As this 
suggests, both perspectives are as much normative as they are empirical. 
Neblo et al (2010a: 573) argue the sunshine perspective items tap into an idealised sense of 
what democracy could be: ‘how they [citizens] think representative democracy should 
work in principle’. In contrast to the realist, negative judgement about politics captured by 
the stealth perspective, the constituency for this conventional and positive narrative about 
what democracy could be about should be greater than that for the stealth view. Sunshine 
captures a default understanding based on long-standing civic culture norms. As such, we 
might expect that the factors driving its support will not be as distinctive as those driving 
the more populist, angst-ridden stealth understanding.  
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We argue that this framing of stealth views as, at the same time, eroding but existing 
alongside the bedrock of sunshine perspectives is helpful when trying to understand the 
dilemmas of contemporary democracies. The issue is not which form of democracy citizens 
prefer, but rather why so many citizens find the practice of contemporary politics so 
consistently disappointing and alienating. Stealth views capture an expression of a classic 
populist anxiety about the gap between democracy as redemptive popular sovereignty and 
its rather more prosaic and pragmatic contemporary practice that in turn finds idealized 
expression in the sunshine perspective.  
Research Design: Data collection and methods 
The research we report was conducted in partnership with the Hansard Society, a non-
partisan think tank based in London that focuses on issues of democratic politics and 
engagement. The Hansard Society has used annual face-to-face surveys to conduct an audit 
of political engagement in Britain since 2003. In 2011/12 our research team were able to 
add questions to their audit survey on stealth and sunshine attitudes, replicating the 
questions posed in the earlier studies. The survey was conducted through face-to-face 
interviews with a representative quota sample of 2,454 adults aged 16 or above living in 
Great Britain, conducted by TNS-BMRB. The interviews took place in two waves (first wave: 
7-13 December 2011, 1,193 respondents; second wave: 11-15 January 2012, 1,261 
respondents) and were carried out in respondents’ homes.  
We had the advantage of using an already established and robust survey and working with 
an established survey instrument at relatively modest cost. Yet we were also using a survey 
designed for a broader general purpose and a rather different overall focus. Appending 
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additional questions to an existing survey also meant that compromises had to be made 
about the way questions were asked because of a desire not to overstretch the time 
involved in undertaking the survey for respondents. For example, the questions about 
stealth and sunshine attitudes were asked randomly to a sample of half the respondents in 
each wave, providing a substantial (1000 +) sample for each analysis but leaving us unable 
to test, for example, responses from citizens who were strong supporters of both stealth 
and sunshine orientations. There were also limits to the range of questions that could be 
asked that could have provided useful independent variables. The survey is rich in its 
questions and potential insights but some variables which might credibly help explain 
stealth or sunshine attitudes were not incorporated. These include details of respondents’ 
educational attainment, attitudes to conflict avoidance and the strength of partisan 
commitments. These missing variables limit what we claim from our survey results but do 
not undermine its capacity to support our reframing of the stealth arguments through a 
populist lens, as we shall demonstrate.  
So far we have talked about stealth and sunshine in conceptual terms but not in terms of 
how it they might be gauged and measured. To capture stealth attitudes requires the use of 
innovative survey questions designed and first deployed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
(2002) in a representative sample survey in the United States in 1998. That work was 
replicated by Neblo et al (2010a) in the United States; these authors also devised and 
deployed an additional set of sunshine questions in the same study. Bengtsson and Mattila 
(2009) redeployed the same stealth questions in Finland. Webb (2013) replicated both 
stealth and sunshine questions for Britain. Evans et al (2013) did the same for Australia, 
whilst Coffe and Michels (2014) have used the stealth measures in a study in the 
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Netherlands. In sum, the survey instruments that are key to measuring stealth and 
sunshine are relatively new but have been successfully used in a range of countries.  
Stealth attitudes were identified by gauging respondents’ support for the following four 
statements:  
1. Elected politicians would help the country more if they would stop talking and just 
take action on important problems1. 
2. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out one’s principles. 
3. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business 
people. 
4. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, 
independent experts rather than politicians or the people.  
However, following the suggestion of Neblo et al (2010b), we offered six responses: 
‘strongly agree’, ‘tend to agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’ ‘tend to disagree’, ‘strongly 
disagree’ and ‘don’t know’. 
The sunshine questions were asked in the two tranches of the 2011/12 survey to half of 
respondents on a random basis. The questions directly replicated those pioneered by Neblo 
et al (2010). Respondents were asked to give one of six responses (strongly agree/tend to 
agree/neither agree or disagree/tend to disagree/strongly disagree/ do not know) to four 
statements:    
                                                           
1 We substituted the word ‘politician’ for ‘official’ as the term ‘elected official’ is not used so commonly in 
Britain. 
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1. Openness to other people's views and willingness to compromise are important for 
politics in a country like ours2.  
2. It is important for elected politicians to discuss and debate things thoroughly before 
making major policy changes3.  
3. In a democracy like ours, there are some important differences between how 
government should be run and how a business should be managed.  
4. It is important for the people and their elected representatives to have the final say 
in running government, rather than leaving it up to unelected experts. 
The design of survey questions is a challenging endeavour. Following others, we offered 
closed rather than open-ended questions for practical reasons of survey administration 
and in order to minimize the demands on respondents. Because we offered the option of 
“don’t know” and “neither agree nor disagree” (in contrast to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse) 
we hoped to avoid creating forced choices for respondents. But we recognise that there is a 
considerable debate about the advantages or not of this option (Pastek and Krosnick, 2010). 
Yet the core criteria for good survey design were met unambiguously in the sense that the 
questions asked were relatively easy to answer and they followed conversational 
                                                           
2 The wording used by Neblo et al (2010a) is slightly different, in that it includes at the end the statement, ‘in 
a country as diverse as ours’. This, we reasoned, was more suited to the USA context, and might also be seen 
as leading the respondent to acquiescence with the statement to a greater degree than our more neutral 
wording   
3 Again, as in the equivalent stealth question, we used the phrase ‘elected politicians’ in preference to its US 
counterpart, ‘elected officials’. 
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conventions, thereby avoiding the potential for misunderstanding (Pastek and Krosnick, 
2010).   
This said, both the stealth and sunshine battery of questions are, even in the view of their 
respective designers, far from perfect (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 143-4; Neblo et al, 
2010b: 34-43). Yet ultimately both sets of authors claim, convincingly in our view, that the 
questions they pose capture core attributes of stealth and sunshine perspectives. Indeed, 
arguably, and crucially when it comes to our own methodological choices, these studies – in 
and through the questions they pose – essentially serve to define stealth and sunshine 
perspectives empirically. As such, if our findings are to be comparable with those of 
existing studies, we need to use the same formulation of words. But there are undoubtedly 
methodological issues here that need addressing. 
Neblo et al (2010b: 34) note that a key motivation for formulating the sunshine items in the 
way they do is to counteract the fear of acquiescence bias. Arguably the best evidence that 
they achieved this is their finding, which our own analysis confirms, that the two sets of 
survey questions prompted rather different patterns of response and, crucially, have very 
different correlates (see also Webb 2013; Evans et al. 2013). Reinforcing this impression is 
a further observation – namely, that logistic regression modeling of each of the stealth and 
sunshine questions separately, reveals common determinants for each of the stealth 
questions and common, but different, determinants for each of the sunshine questions. As 
Figure 1 shows, stealth and sunshine do not share the same drivers, with the exception that 
both correlate with a tendency to support greater use of direct democratic devices. The 
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stealth and sunshine questions are capturing something more than people trying to be 
agreeable. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
That said, the stealth and sunshine questions are related in the sense that the sunshine 
questions are set up, in effect, as a mirror opposite to the original stealth items. So it is 
interesting to note that in some surveys, such as those administered by Neblo et al (2010 a 
and b) in which both tranches of questions were posed to the same respondents, it is clear 
that many individuals that were supporters of a stealth view were also supporters of a 
sunshine view. This does not surprise us, for reasons already alluded to. The explanation 
offered by Neblo et al (2010b; 40-3) is that respondents ostensibly agreeing with stealth 
propositions are passing a judgement on ‘actually existing’ political systems, whilst their 
support for sunshine responses reflected a more idealised aspiration or ideal (in effect, a 
view of how politics should be). This, we feel, is unconvincing and reads too much like an 
attempt to explain away and rationalise a seeming paradox – a paradox premised on the 
assumed incommensurability of stealth and sunshine view (and the irrationality of holding 
both views simultaneously). For us there is simply no such paradox. Public attitudes are, 
like politics itself, conditional and complex – and, in making sense of the complexity of 
politics, citizens inevitably draw on a range of pre-formulated vernaculars or dispositional 
orientations which may, on the face of it, appear contradictory. So it is perfectly reasonable 
for a person to express agreement with propositions from both sets of ostensibly 
competing views, with the stealth set of attitudes available to be triggered by a negative 
experience of politics whilst the more positive set of sunshine attitudes are available to be 
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triggered by a more positive cue. Tests on our data using positive and negative triggers for 
political engagement show the operation of precisely such effects (Authors, 2013).   
Finally, we know that question wording, the ordering of questions and the ordering of 
responses can affect survey results (Pastek and Krosnick, 2010). Yet the stealth and 
sunshine items we use are becoming an established part of the range of survey questions 
used within political science. Some may still argue that they prompt certain responses; yet 
the distinct, varied and yet consistent pattern of the responses that we and others generate 
using such survey questions we think makes that claim implausible. Notwithstanding any 
shortcomings that exist, we would argue that the stealth and sunshine survey questions do 
what all good questionnaires aim to achieve in that they ‘offer a window into political 
attitudes and behaviours that would be impossible to achieve through any other research 
design’ (Pastek and Krosnick 2010: 11). Choosing to replicate the original formulation of 
the questions is also crucial to achieving the comparability of our results with that of the 
existing literature that we seek.  
Following the practice of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), the Stealth 1-4 questions were 
combined in a compound index of the four responses – coded ‘1’ for those respondents 
giving a positive answer to each of Stealth 1 and 2 questions and to at least one of the 
Stealth 3 and Stealth 4 questions (and coded ‘0’ for any other set of responses)4. The 
production of a dichotomous dependent variable in this way allowed us to deploy binary 
                                                           
4 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 143-4) offer no direct explanation for this choice but suggest that while 
the first two items capture distinctive features of the stealth perspective the responses to the business and 
expert involvement questions capture the shared idea that policy-making would be better if non-elected 
independent voices were involved in decision-making rather than professional politicians. 
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logistic regression modelling techniques to study the influence of a range of independent 
variables. Neblo et al (2010a) propose a similar procedure for the sunshine questions.   
The survey methodology also allowed us to explore the influence of a range of factors 
identified as potentially significant drivers of stealth perspectives in our discussion of 
populism. These were grouped under five headings. First the survey enabled us to cover 
the standard demographic variables such as gender, age and social class often associated 
with political behaviour. A further set of variables were concerned with interest in, and 
knowledge of, politics. A third set of variables introduced into the analysis sought to 
capture the relationship between stealth and expressed attitudes to the system of 
governing. A fourth set of factors sought to capture citizens’ perceived personal efficacy – 
namely, whether they might or could (if they so wished) influence decision-making at local 
and national levels. A fifth set of explanatory variables explored perceptions of the 
influence of the media and evidence on the impact of reported news readership based on 
distinctions between broadsheet, tabloid and local newspaper readership.5 Finally, the 
Finnish study (Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009) found a strong connection between stealth 
attitudes and a commitment to greater use of direct democracy. To see if a similar effect 
                                                           
5 The following newspapers – The Sun, Mirror, People, Daily Star, Daily Record, Sunday Mirror, Sunday People, 
Sunday Sport, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Sunday Express, and Mail on Sunday - were designated as tabloids. The 
Daily Telegraph, Times, Guardian, Financial Times, Independent, Sunday Telegraph, Sunday Times, Observer, 
and Independent on Sunday were similarly designated broadsheets. Sometimes a three-fold distinction is 
drawn between the tabloids, the broadsheets and an additional category of mid-market papers including the 
Daily Mail, the Daily Express and their Sunday editions. But for our purposes, given our interests in tabloid 
populism, there is no case for making such a distinction.  
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was present amongst the British sample we included an additional question formulated in 
the same way (on support for a greater use of referendums).  
We accompanied our survey work with 14 focus groups conducted in various locations 
throughout Britain in 2011 and 2012. The focus groups were each facilitated by one of the 
research team. They were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The focus groups were 
used to gauge citizens’ understandings of politics, their sense of what was wrong or right 
with its conduct, and to explore in more detail the criteria by which such judgments were 
made. Each group concluded with a discussion of potential reforms to the political system 
and what might be done to improve politics and citizens’ experiences of it. We then used 
the ideas emerging from the focus groups to present a series of reform options in a survey 
conducted in Britain in December 2012 by TNS-BMRB. This used face-to-face interviews 
with a representative quote sample of 1128 adults (for more details see Hansard Society, 
2013, pp. 103-105).  
Despite their limitations, the four stealth and sunshine responses do capture a negative 
populist orientation towards politics on the one hand and a more positive commitment to 
the values and processes of representative democracy on the other. In short, they allow us 
to explore empirically some important matters for understanding the degree and nature of 
citizens’ estrangement from politics in contemporary democracies. 
Results: the Connection between Stealth and Populism  
Table 1 provides the details of the responses obtained from our British survey. It confirms 
majority support for the first two stealth propositions on the need for more action and less 
talk from politics and the importance of politicians sticking to their stated principles. The 
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idea of a greater role in governing by experts or business leaders receives a more balanced 
response with roughly equal numbers agreeing and disagreeing. Subtracting those 
disagreeing from those in agreement reveals more still about the shape of the responses. 
For the ‘talk’ item, the result is +64.7; for the ‘compromise’ item +38.8; for the ‘experts’ 
item +1.3; and for the ‘business’ -3.9.  
Support for the first two items on the stealth list is higher than support on the second two, 
a finding that is matched in other comparative work (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; 
Neblo et al, 2010a; Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009, Webb, 2013). Citizens are bothered about 
politics being “all talk and no action” and “too much about compromises” but are not so 
willing to the same degree to express ‘a broad fondness for nondemocratic decision-making 
structures’ (Neblo et al, 2010, p. 580). When they do support a greater role for business 
people or experts, this seems to be associated with a clear and palpable frustration with the 
job of governing being done by elected politicians (a finding confirmed in the focus group 
data). Stealth, in this light, we would argue is less about being opposed to a vision of more 
expansive democracy and more about a concern and frustration about the way democratic 
politics works. In short, it is about a populist angst.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The heart of the stealth perspective, then, is support for the first two propositions. We can 
judge the depth of that support by following the procedure suggested by Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse – namely, by counting those respondents that support both propositions and 
either one of the last two stealth statement. Three or more stealth democratic traits are in 
the case of our British respondents supported by 35.5 per cent of respondents. 
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Interestingly, the strength of support for such views in Britain is higher than that recorded 
either by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s (2002) in the USA (27.2 per cent) or by Bengtsson 
and Mattila(2009) in Finland (25.7 per cent).  
Our argument for the populist character of stealth attitudes is reinforced if we examine the 
correlates and drivers of such a stealth orientation in more detail. Figure 1 confirms stealth 
and sunshine drivers are different. Table 2 displays the results of an estimated logistic 
regression analysis with accumulated support for stealth as the dependent variable. In 
terms of demographic factors, and in contrast to the American and Finnish samples, in 
Britain age is a pronounced driver of stealth attitudes for those aged 35-54. Support for 
stealth was also stronger among those aged 55+. Among other significant factors driving 
stealth support are a set of attitudinal tie-ups that fit with our broad designation of stealth 
as a populist response to the contingencies of modern politics. Citizens who think that the 
system of governing is working well are roughly half as likely to adopt a stealth perspective 
compared to those who think that the system of governing works less well. Another 
attitudinal response that would appear to fit with a populist framing of stealth is that those 
who express an interest in politics are roughly half as likely to adopt a stealth attitude, 
compared to those who profess no such interest. Yet those citizens who support greater 
use of referendums to decide important questions are at least twice as likely to adopt a 
stealth world view as those who do not support the proposition. Again we see a populist 
framing in stealth views, as frustrated citizens favour a more direct say for “the people” in 
decision-making as a result. These various findings largely confirm our view of stealth 
consciousness as part of a populist vernacular. Stealth attitudes are more prominent 
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amongst older voters, those who are disaffected and turned-off politics and would in their 
frustration like to see more chance for direct control by citizens.   
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
We are further reinforced in this view by the evidence that connects stealth attitudes to 
reported behaviour, in particular to newspaper readership. By far the strongest factor 
driving stealth attitudes in the entire analysis is readership of a national tabloid newspaper. 
Within the British sample, respondents are nearly four times as likely to adopt a stealth 
perspective if they read a tabloid newspaper compared to a broadsheet. The effect is still 
quite strong and in the same direction for readers of both a tabloid and a broadsheet. 
Reading a local newspaper, many of which now also take a tabloid form, also appears to be 
a significant driver of stealth attitudes, although the impact is not quite as strong as for 
readership of a national tabloid. But such respondents are still more than twice as likely to 
adopt stealth views compared to a broadsheet reader. 
We have clearly demonstrated a correlation between the stealth perspective and 
newspaper readership. However, we recognise that the direction of causation is, as ever, a 
deal more difficult to establish definitively. First, as is widely recognised in the literature 
(for a review see Street, 2011, pp. 101-118), media effects on politics are difficult to 
demonstrate. The evidence is tantalizing in the sense that we cannot be sure if those 
holding stealth attitudes favour tabloid newspapers, or, conversely, whether reading 
tabloid papers is driving stealth attitudes. If ever there were a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, 
this is it (see also Newton & Brynin 2001, p. 265): is it that readers choose newspapers 
aligned to their views or do newspapers by their presentation of the news influence 
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readers’ views? The challenge is partly methodological and given access to only one set of 
survey results, it is largely irresolvable. It could be addressed by carefully constructed 
experiments or through the use of time series panel data. But, as neither of those options 
were open to us, we are left with the observation that to connect tabloid readership with 
stealth attitudes goes with the grain of the insight emerging from most political 
communication scholarship (Street, 2011). An emphasis on work that argues that media 
effects are relatively weak and likely merely to reinforce existing attitudes has given way to 
an alternate view that is prepared to concede that the media may have more direct and 
powerful effects on citizens’ views and behaviour. Moreover, while much of the early work 
focused on the impact on voting behaviour, some of the more recent trends have been 
towards work looking at broader impacts and cumulative impacts of the media on citizens’ 
attitudes (Gavin and Sanders, 2003; for a more general discussion, see Whiteley 2011). This 
work generally tends to the view that impacts of a significant scale do occur, at least on 
specific groups of voters. Our study is entirely consistent with such a conclusion.  
Our core argument is that stealth attitudes constitute a distinctive type of negativity 
towards politics, reflecting in turn a populist orientation in all contemporary democracies 
created by the tension between the promise of democracy and its more messy delivery. A 
strong stealth orientation is not tied significantly to a perceived sense of powerlessness as 
measured by various efficacy questions. Stealth supporters do want to have more of a say 
through referendums but we argue that such a stance is consistent with a broader populist 
perspective.  
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The limits to populist angst: let the sunshine in  
A stealth orientation exists among a substantial section of British citizens. But, as suggested 
for the USA by Neblo et al (2010), it is also possible to find even larger support for a set of 
more positive propositions about the way that politics works. Table 3 shows support for 
the four sunshine propositions we tested. The pattern of support is generally greater than 
that shown for the equivalent items that constitute the test of the prevalence of stealth 
values. The exception is the ‘talk’ item which achieved 71.6% agreement in it stealth form 
but only 67.7% in the sunshine form. On the other three items the sunshine “agree” 
responses comfortably outstripped the stealth ones. Taking agree responses away from 
disagrees reveals a strong pattern of support with the talk item at +62.2, the openness item 
at +74, the business item at +60.1 and the expert item at +59.9.  
If we accumulate the sunshine responses in a manner equivalent to that we used for stealth 
responses (by selecting those respondents who agree with the first two sunshine 
statements and at least one of the last two) we get an idea of the depth of support for the 
sunshine perspective. We find that 64 per cent of respondents supported three or more 
sunshine traits. In short, it is clear that sunshine values outstrip stealth values by a large 
degree in the British sample, nearly doubling accumulated stealth support. The lesson to be 
drawn from these findings appears clear. Populist angst about the way politics works exists, 
but against a background in which other more positive folk intuitions about politics persist. 
The issue thus becomes, for us, what might trigger in citizens an understanding of politics 
and political experience couched more in terms of such positive dispositions. How, in other 
words, might politics be reformed so as to crowd out stealth and let the sunshine in?  
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Neblo et al (2010) suggest that more opportunities for deliberation with the system of 
democratic decision-making are the way forward. We think that rather than going for one 
pre-ordained solution it might be better to explore reform options more widely (and, 
indeed, inductively). After all, our survey found relatively high levels of support for greater 
levels of direct democracy through the use of referendums (72% agreed with the statement 
that ‘important questions should be determined by referendums more often than today’). It 
also found that strong supporters of stealth and sunshine perspectives were more likely to 
be backers of that option. Rather than assume a priori what might trigger a more positive 
orientation towards politics we thought it preferable to ask citizens themselves.  
Reforming politics: Citizens’ Preferences  
Accordingly, at the end of the focus group sessions we asked the participants to identify, in 
writing, three reform ideas for improving politics, whether mentioned in the prior 
discussion or not. The 153 participants gave us a potential 459 reform ideas. Only a few 
members of the focus groups did not offer three ideas and even fewer offered ideas that 
were difficult to fathom. We gave our focus group participants no steer as to what type of 
reforms they might identify; their task was merely to propose reforms which they felt had 
some credible chance of improving the politics they are currently offered. We received 450 
useable suggestions (these are summarised in Table 4).  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
As Table 4 shows the top preference, in terms of reform ideas, was to ensure that those 
who made decisions, especially elected representatives, were open in what they did and 
accountable for their performance. In the discussion in the focus groups there were many 
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occasions when unfavourable comparisons were made between the mechanisms of 
accountability that people found themselves subject to in their own working lives and the 
perceived unaccountability of elected representatives. Similarly, repeated emphasis was 
placed on the perceived basic lack of performance delivery mechanisms available to 
citizens to hold politics in check, or even to account. Another big concern was improving 
communication and ensuring that fair and accessible information about decisions (and 
their underlying rationale) is provided. A further concern was about broadening the social 
base and experience of those standing for office as elected representatives.  
In a wider representative sample survey undertaken as part of the Hansard Society’s Audit 
of Political Engagement 2013 (Hansard Society, 2013) we were able to test whether the 
reform options selected by the focus groups were favoured more generally by the public. 
The results (see Table 5) do indeed show very similar reform preferences among citizens in 
this representative sample to those identified through the focus groups.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
Conclusion  
Understanding popular negativity towards politics in contemporary democracies is a 
crucial task, as is diagnosing its causes and potential solutions. Sadly it remains the case 
that, as political scientists, we understand a lot more about what drives voting behaviour 
than the more elusive topic of how citizens understand and think about democratic politics. 
Yet, without deepening considerably our understanding of how citizens’ orient themselves 
to the practices of contemporary democracy it would seem impossible to grasp the 
significance and nature of the challenge posed by negativity towards politics, let alone to 
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respond creatively to that challenge in such a way as to address the concerns from which it 
issues. In such a context, the lens provided by the stealth perspective is particularly helpful. 
We have shown that stealth attitudes are prevalent and we have argued that such attitudes 
can and should be seen as the expression of a populist angst about the way politics works. 
Many British citizens hold stealth views.  
However, we have also shown there is a popular base for a more positive understanding of 
politics held by an even larger group of citizens. Public opinion can express frustration with 
politics. But equally, it appears that it can just as readily see a way forward that is 
normatively defensible and compatible with the aspirations of many citizens. However, 
judging by the expressed aspirations of citizens themselves, the way forward does not only 
appear to be the deliberative participation favoured by many deliberative theorists. 
The most popular of the reform approaches chosen by citizens in our study seem to match 
with a stealth populist critique of contemporary political practice rather than a strong 
desire for more deliberative participation. The top reform ideas that emerge from citizens 
themselves are all about making representative democracy work in practice the way they 
think it should, such that their confidence in politics as a governing process might be 
restored. The onus of the reform trajectory is on a shift in the behaviour of elected 
representatives in terms of their accountability and responsiveness. In addition what is 
clear is that the populist negativity displayed by citizens may require more effort at 
promoting a better understanding of politics (Flinders, 2012). It is here particularly telling 
that better information and education about politics were high on the list of reform options 
favoured by citizens.  
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Designing the mechanisms to produce reforms to convince citizens that such a bringing 
together of aspiration and reality is possible remains a significant challenge. The reform 
suggestions from citizens offer some useful guidelines but hardly provide the blueprint 
designs for institutional reforms. Yet  parliaments across established democracies have 
shown a willingness to undertake some reforms to re-connect with citizens (Beetham, 
2011) and many of these reforms, on the surface, address some of the concerns outlined in 
Tables 4 and 5. But there are doubts that the reforms go far enough. We hope that David 
Beetham (2011, p. 140) is right when he suggests there are forces at work that will open up 
the existing processes of representative democracy to radical change – whilst also 
revealing to citizens more of the internal workings of the political process in a way that 
encourages support for the complex and convoluted dynamics of democracy in complex 
and divided societies. 
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of selected significant drivers of stealth and sunshine 
democracy in Britain 
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Table 1: Responses (%) on stealth items in Britain, 2011-12 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
STEALTH QUESTIONS 
Response Politicians should   Compromise is  Leave decisions to   Leave                                                                        
stop talking and   selling out one’s   successful business                 decisions 
to 
take action  principles   people   non-elected 
         experts 
__________  __________  __________  __________ 
 
% N  % N  % N  % N 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
SA  37.6 465  19.6 243  10.0 124  8.9 110 
PA  34.0 421  32.3 400  20.8 258  22.4 277 
PD  5.3 66  10.8 134  20.2 250  18.0 223 
SD  1.6 20  2.3 28  14.5 179  12.0 149 
NA/ND 17.3 214  29.4 364  29.7 368  33.1 410 
DK  4.2 52  5.6 69  4.8 59  5.6 69 
      
Total  100.0 1238  100.0 1238  100.0 1238  100.0     1238 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------ 
Key: SA: strongly agree; PA: partly agree; PD: partly disagree; SD: strongly disagree; NA/ND: 
Neither agree nor disagree 
DK: Don’t know 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates for Logistic regression model of responses on Stealth 
Democracy in Great Britain, 2011-2012 (N=899) 
Determinant Log odds ratio standard error Wald-statistic Df  P-value Odds ratio 
Constant  -2.46***  0.46  28.24  1  0.00 0.09 
Demographic 
Gender (male: reference) 
Female  0.17  0.16  1.14  1  0.29 1.19 
Age (18-34: reference) 
35-54  0.77***  0.20  14.62  1  0.00 2.16 
55+  0.57**  0.21  7.49  1  0.00 1.76 
Social class (A or B) 
C1 or C2  0.09  0.22  0.16  1  0.69 1.09 
D or E  0.21  0.24  0.76  1  0.38 1.23 
Political Interest and Knowledge  
Likely to vote (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.26  0.19  1.83  1  0.18 0.77 
Interest (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.92***  0.25  13.44  1  0.00 0.40 
Knowledge (no: reference) 
Yes  0.16  0.22  0.51  1  0.48 1.17 
Knowledge of parliament (no: reference) 
Yes  0.14  0.22  0.43  1  0.51 1.15 
Attitudes to Governing System 
Governing system works well (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.55***  0.18  9.63  1  0.00 0.58 
Parliament holds government to account (no: reference) 
Yes  0.50**  0.18  7.70  1  0.01 1.65 
Parliament encourages public involvement (no: reference) 
Yes  0.17  0.18  0.92  1  0.34 1.19 
Parliament is essential to democracy (no: reference) 
Yes  0.09  0.21  0.20  1  0.66 1.10 
Parliament debates matter (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.07  0.18  0.14  1  0.71 0.93 
Engagement and Efficacy 
Involvement in politics could change the way country run (no: reference) 
Yes  0.28  0.17  2.67  1  0.10 1.33 
Involvement in local community could change the way area is run (no: reference) 
Yes  0.13  0.18  0.54  1  0.46 1.14 
Have influence on decision of making in local area (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.22  0.20  1.24  1  0.27 0.80 
Have influence on decision making in the country (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.39  0.24  2.67  1  0.10 0.67 
Want involvement of decision of making in local area (no: reference) 
Yes  0.16  0.23  0.48  1  0.49 1.17 
Want involvement of decision of making in the country (no: reference) 
Yes  0.31  0.23  1.80  1  0.18 1.36 
Media: Influence and Readership 
Media influences how people vote (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.24  0.24  0.96  1  0.33 0.79 
Media influences the topics politicians’ debate (no: reference) 
Yes  0.34  0.21  2.66  1  0.10 1.40 
Media influences the decisions politicians make (no: reference) 
Yes  -0.01  0.19  0.00  1  0.98 0.99 
Print media readership (Broadsheet readers only: reference) 
Tabloid readers only 
  1.30***  0.26  24.77  1  0.00 3.68 
Both  0.89***  0.31  8.22  1  0.00 2.43 
Local newspaper or other readers only 
  1.00***  0.32  9.96  1  0.00 2.72 
 None  0.56*  0.29  3.62  1  0.06 1.75 
Greater use of direct democracy 
Support more direct democracy (no: reference) 
Yes  0.78***  0.22  12.85  1  0.00 2.18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*0.10>p ≥0.05; **0.05>p ≥0.01; ***p<0.01; Df: degrees of freedom; Nagelkerke R square: 0.19; -2loglikelihood: 1042.39 
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Table 3: Responses (%) on sunshine items in Britain, 2011-12 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
SUNSHINE DEMOCRACY QUESTIONS 
                    Elected politicians                        Openness and willingness        Important differences               Important for  
Need to debate      to compromise are                         exists between running                elected 
Before making     important to           a government and               politicians to  
decisions     politics           business                decide rather  
                       than leaving it 
                       to experts 
__________  __________  __________  __________ 
% N  % N  % N  % N 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SA  29.9 364  49.7 604  26.4 321  31.3 380 
PA  37.8 460  26.6 324  37.9 461  33.7 410 
PD  3.6 44  1.6 20  3.0 36  3.9 48 
SD  1.9 23  0.7 8  1.2 14  1.2 15 
NA/ND  21.5 261  16.7 203  25.2 306  24.2 294 
DK  5.3 64  4.7 57  6.4 78  5.7 69 
      
Total  100.0 1216  100.0 1216  100.0 1216  100.0     1216 
Key: SA: strongly agree; PA: partly agree; PD: partly disagree; SD: strongly disagree; NA/ND: 
Neither agree nor disagree 
DK: Don’t know 
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 Table 4:  Classification of Political Reform Ideas from Citizens  
Reform Idea  Numbers of 
Mentions (%) 
Change processes of politics to make it more accountable and 
to ensure that what is promised is delivered  
128 (28) 
Better education, information exchange and less spin in 
communication  
68 (15) 
Give citizens more of say (especially through referendums)  73 (16) 
Deal with issues that are of concern  58 (13) 
Improve representativeness and accessibility of MPs  43 (9) 
Institutional changes to parliament, constitution reform  or 
changes to electoral system  
41 (9) 
Get more experts involved in decision-making  15 (3) 
Create a more positive media environment for politics  13 (3) 
Give local communities more of a say  7   (-) 
Get politicians to be more normal  4  (-)  
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Table 5 Reform preferences for improving politics  
Which of the following changes do you think would improve the 
British political system the most? Please pick up to three. 
 
      %  
Make politics more transparent so that it is easier to follow  48 
Make politicians more accountable for their performance between 
elections 
39 
Better information and education about politics for all citizens  32 
Less ‘spin’ in political communication 26 
Give citizens more of a say (e.g. more referendums, more consultation) 29 
Get experts more involved in decision-making 17 
More positive media coverage of politics 12 
Constitutional changes (e.g. an elected House of Lords, a different voting 
system) 
8 
More people like me as MPs  6 
None of these 11 
Source: Data from Hansard Society (2013) Audit of Political Engagement  
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